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WORLDWIDE FRAND LICENSING
STANDARD
GARRY A. GABISON*
Worldwide licenses linked to the standard-setting process are being
challenged on antitrust and jurisdictional grounds. While, so far, most
courts have batted away these challenges, some courts have not
recognized their validity. Ifworldwide licenses were to not be enforced
globally, then the patent exhaustion doctrine could further eat into the
patent holders' returns. Raising cost of enforcement linked to local
licenses and lower returns linked to patent exhaustion would
disincentivize standard-setting participants. These worldwide licenses
are essential to the standard system and must be protected as such: the
standard-setting organizations, antitrust authorities, and courts have a
part to play to ensure the standards survive these attacks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, the number of standards, standard-associated
patents, and patent litigation has steadily increased in the United States
("U.S.").' Recently, these litigations have challenged various aspects of
licenses associated with standards.2
Standard Setting Organizations ("SSOs") 3 have often set broad licensing
terms.4 SSOs created patent declaration to avoid patent ambush.5 Patent
holders declare in letters of assurance to SSOs which of their patents qualify
as essential, 6 which can be defined as patents without a workaround.7
1. See, e.g., Justus Baron & Tim Pohlmann, Mapping Standards to Patents Using
Declarations ofStandard-Essential Patents, J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY (forthcoming)
(manuscript figs. 1 & 6) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3119145##
(illustrating the increase in the number of standard essential patents, associated patents
and associated lawsuits over the last two decades); TIM POHLMANN & KNUT BLIND,
IPLYTICS GMBH, LANDSCAPING STUDY ON STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS (SEPs), 23-
24 fig.14 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/2074 1/attachments/1/trans
lations/en/renditions/native (describing the number of standard essential patent
associated lawsuits in the U.S.).
2. See, e.g., Garry A. Gabison, A Two-Dimensional Approach to Non-
Discriminatory Terms in FRAND Licensing Agreements, 24 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 100,
10244 (2018) (discussing the case law challenging the discriminatory aspect of
standards).
3. Andrew Updegrove, The Essential Guide to Standards Chapter 6,
CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (2007), https://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/forming
2.php (indicating that some standards develop through a cooperative enterprise in SSOs
also referred to in the literature as Standard Developing Organizations ("SDOs")).
4. See, e.g., Michael A. Cusumano et al., Strategic Maneuvering and Mass-Market
Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over Beta, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 51, 65-66, 75-76 (1992)
(describing how VHS won the market and came out as the de facto standard for the
videocassette standard following an intense competitive process with Betamax, with a
focus on the SSO set standards created through cooperation from various entities).
Companies can create a de facto standard by winning the market. Standards discussed
in this paper, however, focus on the SSO set standards created through cooperation from
various entities.
5. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 461, 466-67 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(discussing Rambus' tactics of not disclosing that it held standard essential patents -
tactics later branded as "patent ambush" - and holding that such tactics did not amount
to an attempt to monopolize because Rambus's deceptive conduct aimed at increasing
prices and not monopolizing).
6. See infra note 11.
7. ETSI RULES OF PROCEDURE § 15.6 (EuR. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST. 2018),
http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf ("'ESSENTIAL' as applied to
IPR means that it is not possible on technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into
account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time
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Inventors declare essential patents covering the same or similarly technical
content from different jurisdictions. These patents form a patent family
covered by the same declaration.8 As such, these families can lead to similar
litigations in different jurisdictions.
Besides declarations, SSOs also require that standard participants commit
to licensing their standard essential patents ("SEPs") on Fair, Reasonable,
and Non-Discriminatory ("FRAND") terms.9 SSOs created FRAND
licenses in an attempt to circumvent patent hold-up and royalty stacking,
while encouraging widespread adoption of their standards.' 0 FRAND terms
attempt to decrease the bargaining inequality post-standard adoption." Part
of the FRAND commitment is that SEP holders offer worldwide licenses.12
However, not all SEP implementers are willing participants. Some
commit holdout, which is also known as reverse holdup. Holdout occurs
when a standard implementer uses FRAND commitment against the patent
holder to negotiate a small license fee.13 Part of this bargaining strategy
of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate
EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply with a STANDARD without infringing that
IPR. For the avoidance of doubt in exceptional cases where a STANDARD can only be
implemented by technical solutions, all of which are infringements of IPRs, all such IPRs
shall be considered ESSENTIAL.").
8. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD PATENT STATISTICS MANUAL 71
(2009), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264056442-en.
9. Gabison, supra note 2, at 10244 (discussing the meaning of FRAND terms).
10. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1209 (Fed. Cir.
2014) ("To help alleviate these potential concerns [of patent hold-up and royalty
stacking], SDOs often seek assurances from patent owners before publishing the
standard. IEEE, for example, asks SEP owners to pledge that they will grant licenses to
an unrestricted number of applicants on 'reasonable, and nondiscriminatory' ('RAND')
terms.").
11. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
("[O]nce a patent becomes essential to a standard, the patentee's bargaining power surges
because a prospective licensee has no alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the
patentee's mercy. The purpose of the FRAND requirements . .. is to confine the
patentee's royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent itself as distinct from the
additional value - the hold-up value - conferred by the patent's being designated as
standard-essential.").
12. See, e.g., Letter of Assurance for Essential Patent Claims, IEEE STANDARDS
Ass'N, https://development.standards.ieee.org/myproject/public//mytools/mob/loa.pdf
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019) (illustrating a letter of assurance template where the signatory
promises to "make available a license for Essential Patent Claims under Reasonable Rate
to an unrestricted number of Applicants on a worldwide basis with other reasonable terms
and conditions that are demonstrably free of unfair discrimination" or can declare that it
refuses to grant FRAND licenses) (emphasis added)).
13. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some
Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the
Complexities ofPatent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1093, 1098 (2014).
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relies on leveraging litigation costs against the patent holder - who
promised to license his product regardless - to lower the patent holder's
negotiation threat value.
Some SEP implementers have attempted to use the same technique by
attacking the validity of FRAND worldwide licensing promise. These
attacks have occurred all over the globe. For example, in the U.S., in
InterDigital Communications, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., InterDigital owned SEP
related to different wireless standards.' 5 InterDigital made multiple license
offers for "a worldwide license, while ZTE wanted the license to be limited
to sales in the United States."' 6 Similarly, InterDigital made a similar claim
against Nokia, but Nokia made a U.S.-only counter-offer.1 7 In Germany, this
issue arose in Pioneer v Acer.'" Pioneer held patents linked to the DVD
standards and sued Acer alleging infringement of its SEPs.19 Pioneer and
Acer attempted to negotiate a license: Pioneer offered a worldwide license,
while Acer counter-offered with a license limited to Germany.20
SSOs create standards to increase interoperability, which thereby
increases the value of standards to society.21 Interoperability comes in many
flavors: interoperability between manufacturers, between equipment and
service providers, and between countries. 22 With current global supply
chains, worldwide licenses contribute to all three.
Worldwide licenses offer multiple efficiencies. First, worldwide licenses
increase negotiation efficiency because they avoid another holdout
14. No. 1: 13-cv-00009-RGA, 2014 WL 2206218, at *2 (D. Del. May 28, 2014).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Landgericht Mannheim [LG] [Mannheim Regional Court] Jan. 8, 2016, 7 0
96/14 (¶ 2) (Ger.), aff'd, Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] May 5,2017,
6 U 55/16 (Ger.); Pioneer v. Acer, 4iPCouncil, https://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/german-
court-decisions/lg-mannheim-1/pioneer-v-acer-lg-mannheim (last visited Mar. 10,
2019).
19. 7 0 96/14 (¶¶ 9, 17).
20. 6 U 55/16 (¶¶ 6-8).
21. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
POLICYSTATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO
VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 2-3 (2013) https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/fi
le/1118381/download ("Voluntary consensus standards serve the public interest in a
variety of ways, from helping protect public health and safety to promoting efficient
resource allocation and production by facilitating interoperability among complementary
products. Interoperability standards have paved the way for moving many important
innovations into the marketplace, including the complex communications networks and
sophisticated mobile computing devices that are hallmarks of the modem age.").
22. See id. at 3-4.
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opportunity. Licensors and licensees negotiate over many terms. Having
one fewer term to negotiate makes negotiation less costly. FRAND aims to
grant patent implementers more bargaining power than they have post-
standard adoption to avoid hold-up. Excluding negotiations over territory
leaves fewer opportunity for licensees to hold-out on a given term.24 SEP
holders and willing licensees need only negotiate one license for a whole
patent family instead of multiple licenses for each jurisdiction where the
willing licensees plan to operate.25 This paper argues that only worldwide
licenses should be considered FRAND.
Second, besides negotiation, worldwide licenses ease the contract
enforcement, accounting, and monitoring costs. 26  With worldwide
negotiation, licensees need only discuss how many units were sold
worldwide. 2 7 This information is usually available for large, publicly traded
multinationals. 28 Licensees need not itemize by country because doing so
can be difficult or time consuming, and can inadvertently disclose sensitive
information about production. Furthermore, licensors need not monitor the
movement of licensed/unlicensed good across jurisdictions.
Having multiple national licenses decreases efficiency. FRAND terms
23. See Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
24. See id. at 1333 (Rader, C.J., dissenting-in-part) ("Market analysts will no doubt
observe that a 'hold out' (i.e., an unwilling licensee of an SEP seeking to avoid a license
based on the value that the technological advance contributed to the prior art) is equally
as likely and disruptive as a 'hold up' (i.e., an SEP owner demanding unjustified royalties
based solely on value contributed by the standardization).").
25. Contra id. at 1323 (stating that Motorola had many different licenses).
26. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Methodologies for
Calculating FRAND Damages: an Economic and Comparative Analysis ofthe Case Law
from China, the European Union, India, and the United States, 8 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV.
127, 151 (2017) (noting that licensing on the grounds that ... a patentee "not only has a
'legitimate interest to settle all acts of use' by a single license agreement rather than on
a patent-by-patent basis around the world but would 'incur high costs,' 'including
transaction and monitoring costs."').
27. The parties often negotiate licenses royalty as a function of the pricing of the
embodying product. During these negotiations, they also devise what is the embodying
product. Licenses can take many forms. See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research
Org. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 809 F.3d 1295, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating in the facts
that the parties negotiated different royalty rate starting with a royalty rate of the value
of the final product and a flat rate); id. at 1302 (discusses that the general rule is to base
damages as a function of the price of the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit but "if
a party can prove that the patented invention drives demand for the accused end product,
it can rely on the end product's entire market value as the royalty base"). Courts usually
use the smallest saleable patent-practicing unit, but in some cases, they opt to use entire
market value rule.
28. See Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate-Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential
Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=3253954.
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attempt to guarantee a sufficiently high return for standard creators to
incentivize their participation and a sufficiently low price for standard
implementers to incentivize their participations. 2 9 Forcing patent holders to
negotiate jurisdiction-specific licenses increases transactions costs. This
increase would either decrease the returns to the patent holders 30 or the patent
holders would need to pass on the added cost to licensees. In UnwiredPlanet
v. Huawei Technologies,3 1 Justice Birrs found that an SEP holder must be
compensated for the inconvenience of having to negotiate a state-by-state
license.32 He suggested that the United Kingdom ("UK") licensing rate be
doubled for the inconvenience of having to renegotiate other licensing
agreements abroad.33
Finally, worldwide licenses provide efficiencies for downstream suppliers
and customers. In some jurisdictions, like the U.S., end users can be sued
for patent infringement. 3 4 With worldwide licenses, parts and products can
move across jurisdictions. Downstream customers can ship and sell their
equipment worldwide without having to worry about infringing on any
patents and facing a suit. "[N]ot only is international movement foreseeable,
it is intended because as it is the point of [a standard compliant product]." 35
This article discusses worldwide licenses as an industry standard and the
attacks on the industry standard. First, section two discusses the threats to
worldwide FRAND licensing agreements: antitrust and personal
jurisdiction. So far, courts in the European Union ("EU") and U.S. have
affirmed that only worldwide licenses were FRAND licenses. They have
rebuffed antitrust challenges by failing to find an anticompetitive effect and
jurisdictional challenges by asserting that patents could still be challenged
abroad. Second, section three discusses the global movement of patented
goods. The patent exhaustion doctrine has traditional dealt with the
movement of goods to the U.S. However, this doctrine may be inadequate
29. FREDRIK ERIXON & MATTHIAS BAUER, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR INT'L POLITICAL
EcoN., STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND THE QUEST FOR FASTER DIFFUSION OF
TECHNOLOGY 2-3 (2017), https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Standard-
Essential-Patents-and-the-Quest-for-Faster-Diffusion-of-Technology.pdf.
30. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [92]
(Eng.) (stating that decreasing returns can raise problems: if the standard creators were
not sufficiently remunerated, then they might decide not to participate in the standard
setting process).
3 1. Id.
3 2. Id.
33. Id. [602].
34. See Gaia Bernstein, The End User's Predicament: User Standing in Patent
Litigation, 96 B.U. L. REv. 1929, 1973 (2016) (discussing end-user litigations).
35. UnwiredPlanet Int'l, Ltd. [20171 EWHC (Pat) 711, [6171.
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to deal with FRAND licenses where terms were set by a foreign court.
Finally, section four suggests how some of these concerns can easily be
addressed by SSOs, Antitrust authorities, and the Supreme Court.
II. TiE THREATS TO FRAND WORLDWIDE LICENSES
Worldwide licenses offer efficiencies that help both licensors and
licensees save on negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement. However,
technology implementers have a lot to gain in requesting local licenses
instead of global licenses. They can leverage the cost of litigation against
licensor because a patent holder "cannot practically sue separately around
the world."36 To leverage these litigation costs, SEP implementers have
raised two arguments against worldwide licenses: an antitrust argument and
a personal jurisdiction argument. This section investigates these two
arguments.
A. Bundling & Antitrust
Standards have a complicated relationship with antitrust. For the most
part, SSO participants are either competitors or vertical collaborators.37
Competitors can cooperate on technical aspects of standard, 38 but they
cannot discuss most licensing aspects (e.g. pricing) without violating
antitrust laws. 39 To preempt antitrust liability, SSOs consult with the Justice
Department to ensure they are not violating antitrust laws when
implementing new policies. 40 The efficiency gains (e.g., interoperability and
36. Id. [561].
37. ELI GREENBAUM, FORGETTING FRAND: THE WIPO MODEL SUBMISSION
AGREEMENTS 87 (2015),
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs/frand 2015.pdf.
38. See, e.g., Ruben Schellingerhout, Standard-Setting From a Competition Law
Perspective, COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., (European Commission) 2011, at 3 (2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/201 1__1_en.pdf (discussing the
development of standards and their implementations).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927)
(holding that price fixing between competitors is per se illegal).
40. SSOs often seek an assurance from the antitrust authority that they will not face
antitrust liability when they change their policies. See, e.g., Letter from Renata B. Hesse,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Michael A.
Lindsay, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Feb. 2, 2015), http://wwwjustice.gov/file/33859 1/d
ownload (addressing the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE") after
it sought the approval of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") when the IEEE tried to
implement a new policy where participants could not use injunctive relief while
enforcing their patent); see also Letter from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Michael A. Lindsay, DORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.pdf
(discussing and authorizing the implementation of a new policy that gives the option to
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network effects 41) from coordinating are weighed against the associated
negatives (e.g., decreased competition).
Worldwide licenses have elicited a similar balancing act. The UK High
Court of Justice faced this issue in Unwired Planet v. Huawei
Technologies.42 Unwired held a portfolio of 225 SEPs that covered three
standards and forty-two jurisdictions. 43 Unwired insisted on a worldwide
license, whereas Huawei wanted a UK-only license. Justice Birss argued
that "[licensor and licensee acting reasonably and on a willing basis] would
regard country by country licensing as madness. A worldwide license would
be far more efficient."45
Faced with this efficiency argument, Huawei challenged worldwide
licenses by making an antitrust argument. It argued that the worldwide
license was a form of an unlawful bundling/tying arrangement. 46 Justice
Birss applied the tying rule developed in Microsoft Corp.47 The rule states
that to find an unlawful tying arrangement, the plaintiff must show that (1)
the defendant has market power in tying good; (2) the tying and tied goods
are separate products; (3) the tying and tied goods are sold separately; and
that (4) the tying arrangement restricts competition. The High Court
assumed dominance in the tying good, finding that the patents were separate
products and that Unwired chose to sell them together; however, the Court
did not find sufficient evidence that a worldwide license foreclosed
49
competition.
IEEE members to publicly commit and disclose their most restrictive licensing terms but
the DOJ also warns IEEE that it will investigate if this policy is used to price fix); Letter
from Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Div., to Robert A. Skitol, DRINKER, BIDDLE & REATH LLP (Oct. 30, 2006), http://ww
w justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2 19380.pdf (discussing and approving the
implementation of a new policy requiring VMEbus International Trade Association
members, an SSO, to disclose their most restrictive licensing terms but warning that such
policy will be investigated if used for collusive purposes).
41. Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory or FRAND Commitments and
Other Patent Pledges, 2 UTAH L. REV. 479, 480 (2015) (discussing the benefits
associated with standards).
42. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [2]
(Eng.).
43. Id. at Annex1.
44. Id. [524].
45. Id. [543]-[44].
46. Id. [545].
47. Microsoft Corp v. Comm'n of European Cmtys. [2007] E.C.R. 3619 ¶¶ 15-16.
48. Id.
49. Id. ¶¶ 545-550.
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On appeal,o the Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court's decision that
"only a global license would be FRAND."5 ' Looking at the efficiency issue,
the Court of Appeal wrote that, about efficient negotiation and enforcement
support,5 2 "a global license between a SEP owner and an implementer may
be FRAND. Indeed, on the face of it, it is very hard to see how a contrary
view could be justified." 53
The U.S. perspective mirrors this argument. In 2017, the U.S. Department
of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") published
their latest Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(hereinafter "Antitrust Guidelines"). 4 The Antitrust Guidelines consider a
wide range of licensing-related antitrust issues, including bundling
intellectual property. 5 The Antitrust Guidelines state that:
Package licensing - the licensing of multiple items of intellectual
property in a single license or in a group of related licenses - may be a
form of tying arrangement if the licensing of one intellectual property right
is conditioned upon the acceptance of a license of another, separate
intellectual property right.56
According to this definition, licensing patent families together into a
worldwide license could qualify as a tying arrangement.57
The Antitrust Authorities would then need to assess whether the tying
arrangement is unlawful based on three criteria: "(1) the seller has market
power in the tying product, (2) the arrangement has an adverse effect on
competition in the relevant market for the tying product or the tied product,
and (3) efficiency justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the
anticompetitive effects." 58
First, "[t]he Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade
secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner. 59 Standards can
grant the patent holder market power if a critical mass adopts those
standards. But, even in the standard-setting context, a generalization cannot
50. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2018] EWCA Civ. 2344 (Eng.).
51. Id. [129].
52. Id. [55]-[56].
53. Id. [56].
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2017), https://wwwjustice.gov/atr/IPguideline
s/download.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. at 29.
57. See also infra Section IV.B.
58. Id. at 28-29 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95-96 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)).
59. Id. at 29.
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be made about market power because some standards have substitutes. For
example, Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") and Global System for
Mobiles ("GSM") are multiple access technologies developed in the late
1980s and early 1990s. 6 0  GSM was developed by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI"), an SSO, whereas CDMA
was developed by Qualcomm as a proprietary standard and later adopted as
a standard by the Telecommunications Industry Association, an SSO. 6 1
They were substitutes in the early mobile phone market network.6 2
Second, at worst, worldwide licenses have no effect on competition. At
best, they increase competition. Worldwide licenses increase competition
because products embodying standards can move across borders without the
manufacturers having to obtain new licenses.63 A manufacturer would face
one less barrier to export its products and thus would be incentivized to
export more of its products - thereby competing with local manufacturers.
Third, worldwide licenses have substantial efficiency consideration. They
exploit economies of scope because they bundle similar patents necessary in
different jurisdictions. 6 4 A licensee who only wants a local license would
not be negatively affected: if the licensee does not sell products in a country
where it does not want a license, then the extra coverage has no impact. 65 If
the licensee changes its mind and decides to export to a country where it does
not want a license, then it avoids an additional negotiation or litigation. 66
The DOJ and FTC would not likely challenge global licenses. While the
U.S. courts need not follow the same Guidelines, the Guidelines are based
on U.S. case precedents and hint that these worldwide licenses would not be
invalidated on antitrust grounds.67 In US. Philips Corp. v. International
60. Sascha Segan, CDMA vs. GSM: What's the Difference?, PC MAG UK (Nov. 19
2018, 5:05 PM), https://uk.pcmag.com/news-analysis/11593/cdma-vs-gsm-whats-the-
difference.
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Saint Lawrence Commc'ns LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 2:15-CV-
351-JRG, 2018 WL 915125, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2018) (holding that the plaintiff's
pursuit of worldwide licenses achieves many procompetitive efficiencies, and is not
patent misuse).
64. Id. ("For example, seeking a worldwide license helps both parties avoid the
extraordinary transaction costs of litigating or licensing a global patent portfolio on a
country-by-country or patent-by-patent basis.").
65. Cf Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs. Indus., Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 893,
901 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that worldwide licenses were necessary in defendant's
market because it was a worldwide market, and thus did not have the luxury of selling in
one country).
66. Id. at 914 (stating that worldwide licenses help large companies avoid country-
by-country litigation).
67. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 54, at 1 ("By
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Trade Commission,68 Philips bundled essential and nonessential patents in a
licensing package. 6 9 The U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC")
ruled that the patent bundle was unenforceable because it was a patent misuse
likened to an unlawful tying arrangement. 70 The Federal Circuit recognized
that package licenses ensure access and have cost-saving virtues.7 ' The
Federal Circuit stepped away from a per se rule and pointed out that the ITC
analysis failed to address a number of issues from cost savings to temporal
technological changes.72 The Federal Circuit did not discuss the worldwide
license aspect of the case; nonetheless, it stated that:
If a patentholder has a package of patents, all of which are necessary to
enable a licensee to practice particular technology, it is well established
that the patentee may lawfully insist on licensing the patents as a package
and may refuse to license them individually, since the group of patents
could not reasonably be viewed as distinct products. 73
This statement provides support to the lawfulness of global licenses
because patents in one family may not be distinct products, as they protect
the performance of a similar function. Therefore, if the antitrust tying
argument against worldwide license was made, it seems unlikely that a U.S.
court would rule in favor of said argument.
B. Jurisdictional Reach
SEP implementers have used personal jurisdiction (or the lack thereof) to
attack worldwide licenses and limit the court's reach to national licenses. 74
This section discusses whether courts should impose jurisdictional limits on
FRAND licenses.
This argument was raised in a number of cases across the globe. In the
United Kingdom ("UK"), Huawei made this civil procedure argument to the
High Court. 5 Huawei argued that a UK court does not have jurisdiction to
enforce a license in other countries. 76 Justice Birss had agreed with
stating their general policy, the Agencies hope to assist those who need to predict whether
the Agencies will challenge a practice as anticompetitive.").
68. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193-97 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
69. Id. at 1182.
70. Id. at 1183.
71. Id. at 1193.
72. Id. at 1193-97.
73. Id. at 1196.
74. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015).
75. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [711]
(Eng.).
76. Id. [5531-[541.
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Huawei's approach in the past." Faced with the question anew, he
concluded that even if Huawei agrees to a worldwide license, it can still
challenge the patent validity where it wants.
The Court of Appeal agreed with his reasoning. 7 9 The Court looked at the
treatment from different jurisdictions, including the European Commission,
Germany, the U.S., China, and Japan.so The Court rejected that "the
[worldwide licensing] approach adopted by [Justice] Birss in these
proceedings loses sight of the territorial nature of patent proceedings and
does not accord with the approach taken in other jurisdictions."s' The Court
of Appeal also rejected that this approach would render foreign suits moot
or "usurped the right of foreign courts"8 2 because global licensing does not
foreclose the ability to challenge a patent validity in a different jurisdiction.83
The Court of Appeal rejected Huawei's argument that global licenses would
undermine negotiations or public policy or competition law.
In the U.S., the Ninth Circuit was faced with a cross-jurisdiction injunction
between U.S. and German patent holders in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,
Inc.15 Motorola owned SEPs related to a video-coding standard and to a Wi-
Fi standard.8 6 Motorola encumbered its SEP with RAND commitments.
After unsuccessful licensing negotiations, Microsoft sued Motorola for a
breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing during the negotiation based
on a third party beneficiary theory." In turn, Motorola sued Microsoft in
other fora, including Germany, over the video-coding standard.8 9 In the U.S.
suit, Microsoft sought to stop Motorola's German injunction.90 Microsoft
succeeded in obtaining the injunction to block Motorola's injunction in a
77. Id. [558].
78. Id. [567].
79. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2018] EWCA Civ. 2344 (Eng.).
80. Id. [59]-[73].
81. Id. [74].
82. Id. [81].
83. Id. [88].
84. Id. [95]-[99].
85. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015).
86. See id. at 1031-32 (stating the two SEPs at issue are a video-coding patent and a
Wi-Fi patent).
87. Id. at 1031 (showing that reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (RAND) and fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) have been used interchangeably); Apple,
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 911-12 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Anne Layne-Farrar,
supra note 13, at 1098 (stating that "Fair" was added in an attempt to address issues of
holdout).
88. Microsoft Corp., 795 F.3d. at 1032.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1033.
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U.S. District Court. 9 1 Microsoft was also awarded damages linked to the
cost of defending the German case and the relocation of its distribution
center. 92
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Judge Robart evaluated whether to
grant the anti-suit injunction. 9 3 He first considered the "[e]ffect of the U.S.
Action on the German Action." 94 He found that the case involved the same
parties and because the original license offer was on a worldwide basis -
including the European Patents involved in the German suit - the U.S.
action would be dispositive of the German litigation. 9 5  Second, he
considered whether the injunction would "[f]rustrate a Policy of the Forum
Issuing the Injunction" and found that having two suits would raise the issue
of inconsistent judgment and "the timing of the filing of the German Action
raises concerns of forum shopping and duplicative and vexatious
litigation." 9 6 Lastly, he considered "[w]hether the impact on comity would
be tolerable" and found that the impact would not be intolerable because of
the later timing of the German suit and because the German action involved
the same private U.S. corporations, the U.S. court had a strong interest in the
claims. 97
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 98 In SEP licensing agreements, SEP holders
bundle their family into a single worldwide license as general practice. 99 The
Ninth Circuit recognized this practice and that the two parties were
negotiating a worldwide licensing agreement. 00 The Ninth Circuit viewed
the German litigation as a sign of bad faith dealing.' 0' The U.S. court was
willing to meddle with the German court's decision to grant an injunction
because of the worldwide nature of the licensing negotiation.1 02
Judge Berzon of the Ninth Circuit found that a federal district court could
enjoin proceeding with an action in a foreign court.1 03 He echoed and
91. Id. at 1055.
92. Id. at 1033.
93. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (W.D. Wash.
2012).
94. Id. at 1098-1100.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1100.
97. Id. at 1101-02.
98. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015).
99. Id. at 1030-31.
100. Id. at 1032 n.4.
101. Id. at 1055.
102. Id.
103. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2012).
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affirmed Judge Robart's findings. 04 Particularly, he found that the FRAND
issue is a contractual issue (instead of a patent issue) and the original promise
was of a worldwide license, which encompassed both the U.S. and EU
patents. 05 Much like in the UK Huawei case, the Ninth Circuit signaled that
worldwide licenses were part of the FRAND commitment.
Much like in the UK Huawei case, Ninth Circuit recognized that the
parties could still litigate the validity or infringement finding in a foreign
court.1 06 "[The Ninth Circuit] cannot say that the district court's limited
antisuit injunction to protect its ability to reach that final resolution enacts
any intolerable incursion into Germany's sovereignty."o107
This willingness to intervene across jurisdictions has become more
pervasive in the SEP context because of the worldwide aspect of the FRAND
contractual promises. But this willingness has limits. Apple Inc. v.
Qualcomm Inc. 1os involved a similar request for an anti-suit injunction.
Qualcomm held a number of SEPs linked to wireless standards, and Apple
had implemented these standards in its phones.1 09 Apple filed a suit against
Qualcomm for breach of contract claims, patent claims, and antitrust
claims."10 Qualcomm filed contract-based counterclaims."' Subsequently,
Apple filed a suit in the U.K., Japan, China, and Taiwan.11 2 Qualcomm
moved to have the foreign suits enjoined. 113
The District Court differentiated the Apple v. Qualcomm case from the
Microsoft v. Motorola case on multiple bases." 4 First, the court found that
the parties were differently situated: in Motorola the SEP holder was the one
suing abroad, whereas in Qualcomm the SEP implementer was the one suing
abroad." 5 Second, the court found that the Apple suits were not about the
104. Id. at 889.
105. Id. at 883-85.
106. Id. at 883.
107. Id. at 889.
108. Order Denying Anti-Suit Injunction at 2, Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-
cv-00108-GPC-MNDD (ECF No. 92-1) (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017).
109. Id. at 2-3.
110. Id. at 5-6.
111. Id. at 5.
112. Id. at 8-10.
113. Id. at 10.
114. See id. at 17-20.
115. See id. at 18-20 ("The Microsoft court concluded that the U.S. and foreign
actions were functionally the same because Motorola's contractual commitment to the
standard-setting organization effectively mooted any right Motorola had to bring an
action for infringement in a foreign court. The same cannot be said of Apple's U.S. and
foreign actions. Apple has made no binding commitment that limits where it can bring a
lawsuit, under what laws, or how it can enforce its third-party beneficiary rights under
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licensing agreement but about Qualcomm's business methods: Apple suits
were based on anti-competitive claims and patent exhaustion.11 6 Therefore,
the resolution of the U.S. suit would not resolve the other suits." 7
The court found that the facts of the case did not warrant an anti-suit
injunction. The court found that the cases filed by Apple in other
jurisdictions were not vexatious or oppressive and inconsistent and they did
not justify granting an injunction because Apple did not ask the court for a
worldwide relief "8 Finally, the court found that other countries had their
own interest enforcing their antitrust laws."l 9 In fact, China, Japan, and
Korea had already penalized Qualcomm for its anticompetitive business
methods.1 2 0 As such, these and other countries like the EU had their own
interest in enforcing their own antitrust laws.121 As such, the District Court
rejected the request for injunction.1 2 2  The Qualcomm case shows the
multifaceted issues intertwined with FRAND cases (i.e., antitrust, contract,
and intellectual property).
China has a different approach to FRAND licensing. In Huawei v.
InterDigital,123 the Guangdong High People's Court did not seem willing to
enforce worldwide licenses and instead enforced only a Chinese license. 124
In the case, Huawei claimed that InterDigital violated antimonopoly laws
and its FRAND commitment by charging Huawei higher licensing fees than
Apple and Samsung.1 25 China did not recognize the negotiations that took
ETSI. As a baseline matter, therefore, Apple is free to exercise its rights in the United
Kingdom, China, Taiwan, and Japan under those countries' law.").
116. See id. at 20-21 (favoring Apple's argument that "even the global FRAND issue
will not dispose of the foreign actions because Apple's foreign suits have challenged the
validity and exhaustion of Qualcomm's foreign patents, under foreign patent law, and
have additionally challenged Qualcomm's licensing practices under foreign competition
and anti-trust laws.").
117. Id. at 22 ("Qualcomm has failed to demonstrate that ... an adjudication on the
merits here would dispose of the claims abroad.").
118. Id. at 23-26.
119. Id. at 30-34.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi No. 305 (# -E#'8305-4) [Huawei
Tech. Co., Ltd. v. InterDigital Corp.], http://en.anjielaw.com/downloadRepository/084d
342a-Obc7-4592-a796-52e9b9f140ce.pdf (Guangdong Province HighPeople's Ct. 2013)
(China); see also D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND (and Industrial Policy) in
China, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNIcAL STANDARDIZATION LAw: ANTITRUST
AND PATENTS 315-17 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017).
124. See Sokol & Zheng, supra note 123, at 315-17.
125. See id. (stating that the Guangdong Province High People's Court of China
affirmed the lower court decision).
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place abroad.1 26 In that respect, China took a more limited approach and
distinguished itself from the rest of the world about FRAND worldwide
licenses.
While most courts have enforced worldwide licenses, this approach is not
universal. The next section discusses in more details the third efficiency of
having worldwide licenses: the unencumbered movement of patented goods.
III. GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND MOVEMENT OF PATENTED GOODS
Willful negotiations of worldwide licenses create a number of efficiencies.
First, participants need only negotiate once. Second, patented goods can
move easily through the stream of commerce. This last efficiency can also
be garnered thanks to the patent exhaustion doctrine. This section discusses
in more details why worldwide licenses may not be as necessary to reach
some of its efficiencies.
A. The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine
Even before the introduction of global supply chains and standards, courts
worried about the free movement of patent implementing goods. To deal
with that issue, the U.S. Supreme Court created the patent exhaustion
doctrine. 127
In Bloomer v. McQuewan,128 Woodworth owned a patent and assigned its
right to Wilson, who then licensed the right to Bloomer to make and sell
machines embodying the patented invention in Pittsburg.1 29 McQuewan
licensed the right to make and use machines embodying the same patents.1 3 0
In the meantime, Congress extended the length of patents, and Bloomer sued
McQuewan for infringement by claiming that the original agreement ended
with the original patent length.131 The Court ruled that "[t]he inventor might
126. In the meantime, Huawei and InterDigital were also tangled in arbitration in
France and litigations in the U.S. InterDigital Commc'n, Inc. v. Huawei Inv. & Holding
Co., 166 F. Supp. 3d 463, 467-68, 470-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing the arbitration
between InterDigital and Huawei in France).
127. This doctrine has a long history. Chief Justice Roberts traces its origin as far as
back as 1628 England. Impression Products v. Lexmark International, 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1532 (2017) (stating that Lord Coke wrote that "if an owner restricts the resale or use of
an item after selling it, that restriction 'is voide, because . . . it is against Trade and
Traffique, and bargaining and contracting betweene man and man."'); see also Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (quoting Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 68 U.S. 539, 549 (1864)) (tracing the U.S. Supreme Court first mention as
far back as 1853 in Bloomer v. McQuewan).
128. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549-550 (1853).
129. Id. at 548.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 549.
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lawfully sell [a machine] to him .... And when the machine passes to the
hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It
passes outside of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of
Congress."l 32 This ruling created the patent exhaustion doctrine. In this
ruling, the Supreme Court attempted to balance the interest of the inventors
and machine purchasers.1 3 3 While the issue has evolved over the years, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the patent exhaustion doctrine
continuously. 134 The Supreme Court saw that the patent holders cannot not
use patent law to extend their rights over patent good purchasers beyond their
contractual agreements.1 3 5 The next two subsections discuss how the U.S.
Supreme Court has addressed the patent exhaustion doctrine in the context
of (1) global movement of goods and (2) modern functional patents.
1. Patent exhaustion limits national and international ability to stop
arbitrage
Since Bloomer v. MeQuewan, the Supreme Court has also ruled on patent
exhaustion cases linked to import-export between national and international
jurisdictions.
First, the Supreme Court addressed the national movement of goods
between national territorial divisions devised by the patent holders. Much
like other rights, the Supreme Court consistently found that patent rights did
not grant its holder rights to decrease the movement of patented goods
lawfully purchased, once put in the stream of commerce.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 552-54.
134. See Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 20-22 (1918)
(holding that a patent holder could not use its patent right to enforce a resale price
maintenance); Wade v. Metcalf, 129 U.S. 202, 205 (1889) (holding that if an inventor
and its partners made a machine, then, after the partnership dissolved, the non-inventor
partner could continue using the patented machine without infringing because the patent
right were exhausted); Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 489 (1884) (holding
infringement damages did not exhaust the patent rights); see also Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) (making resale price maintenance
per se illegal); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907
(2007) (reversing Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.).
135. But see Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 280-288 (2013) (holding a
patent on a genetically modified soybean seed was not exhausted by the first purchase of
the seed and the planting of the seed was literal reproduction or copying); id. (departing
from its patent exhaustion doctrine). The Supreme Court asserted that the patent
exhaustion limitation raised in this case was limited to the fact at hand and should not be
read to apply to all self-replicating technology. Id. at 289. Besides its application to seeds
or reproducing genetically modified organisms, the implications of Bowman v. Monsanto
remain unknown.
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In Adams v. Burke,1 36 the Supreme Court repeated this principle when
faced with a patent holder attempting to enforce a territorial restriction. In
this case, a licensee sold a patented coffin lid, but the coffin was used outside
the licensee's territory.1 37 The licensee from the territory where the coffin
was imported sued the coffin purchaser.1 38  The Court found that once
purchased, the purchaser could move the good beyond the licensee's territory
without infringing on the patent. 139
Justice Bradley dissented and pointed out that the patent exhaustion
doctrine granted the licensee more power than negotiated: since its
purchasers could take the good outside its territory, a licensee could target
consumers outside its territory.140
The Supreme Court re-addressed the issue of patent exhaustion and
territorial restriction in Hobbie v. Jennison.14 1 In this case, a patent holder
had licensed his patent for pipes to multiple entities. 142 In doing so, the
patent holder divided the territory and gave an exclusive right to each
licensee within a geographical region.14 3 One licensee ended up selling the
patented pipes to someone building a house outside the licensee's
territory. 44 The licensee from the territory where the house was located sued
the licensee seller of the pipes. '4 The plaintiff attempted to distinguish his
case from Adams v. Burke by affirming that the licensee in Burke did not
know where the coffin would be used, whereas the licensee in Hobbie knew
where the pipes would be installed. 146 The Supreme Court disagreed and
found that neither the sellers nor the users/purchasers are liable under a
territorial restriction agreement. 14 Again, the Court pointed to contracts
being the best avenue to resolve these problems.14
Second, the Supreme Court addressed the international movement of
goods. The Supreme Court addressed patent exhaustion in the international
context in two cases. In both cases, the Court repeated the same principle:
136. 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
137. Id. at 456-57.
138. Id. at 454.
139. Id. at 456-57.
140. Id. at 457-59.
141. 149 U.S. 355, 356 (1893).
142. Id. at 360-61.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 356.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 363-64.
148. Id.
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patents did not grant its right holders the ability to decrease the movement of
patented goods lawfully placed in the stream of commerce.
In Boesch v. Grff 149 the plaintiff held three German patents and one U.S.
patent for an invention, a lamp burner. o50 The defendant bought the patented
invention in Germany and imported the lamps to the U.S.15 ' The German
manufacturer had made the lamps without a license and instead had benefited
from a court ruling that allowed him to continue making lamps because it
had been using the invention prior to the plaintiff applying for the patents.1 52
The Supreme Court ruled that while the German manufacturer was able to
legally make the lamps under German law, it was not able to make them in
the U.S. under U.S. law.1 5 3 Therefore, even though the lamp was legally
made, it could not be legally sold in the U.S.154
After Boesch v. Grff it took over 125 years to re-address this issue.
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. 155 involved a patent
holder, Lexmark, who held foreign and U.S. patents.1 5 6 The patents covered
printing cartridges. Impression Products bought used cartridges from
consumers both in the U.S. and abroad, it refiled the ink in the cartridges,
and resold them to consumers in the U.S.' 57  Lexmark sued for patent
infringement for the refurbishment of U.S.- and foreign-bought cartridges.iss
The Court made a two-part ruling. First, the Supreme Court ruled that
Lexmark exhausted its patent rights by the time Impression Products
purchased the U.S. cartridges.1 5 9 Lexmark had a contractual agreement with
some consumers who received a discount in exchange for their promise not
to sell.1 60 However, Lexmark did not have a contract with Impression
Products and similarly situated refurbishers.161 Lexmark could not use patent
law to enforce a no-resale clause.1 6 2 Once again, the Court pointed out the
149. 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
150. Id. at 698.
151. Id. at 699, 702.
152. Id. at 701-02.
153. Id. at 703.
154. Id.
155. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
156. Id. at 1529.
157. Id. at 1529-30.
158. Id. at 1530.
159. Id. at 1533.
160. Id. at 1530.
161. Id. (noting Lexmark's contractual agreements were exclusively with the initial
customers, not with remanufacturers like Impression Products).
162. Id. at 1533.
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issue of using patent law to enforce incomplete contracts.163
Second, the Supreme Court ruled that Lexmark also exhausted its patent
rights by selling the product abroad.1 64 The Supreme Court distinguishes
Impression Products v. Lexmark from Boesch v. Graffthrough the decision
to sell: Graff held a patent in the U.S. and abroad, but it did not want to sell
abroad, whereas Lexmark held a patent in both jurisdictions and wanted to
sell in both jurisdictions.1 6 5 The Supreme Court supported its argument by
comparing the patent exhaustion doctrine to the copyright first sale
doctrine.1 6 6 The Court stated that while a patent rewards its holder by
providing the right to exclude others, it does not guarantee that "the patentee
receives a premium for selling in the United States." 67  The (smaller)
premiums the patentee receives in other jurisdictions already exhausted its
right.1 68
Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority. 69 She argued that: "[p]atent
law is territorial. When an inventor receives a U.S. patent, that patent
provides no protection abroad . ... Accordingly, the foreign sale should not
diminish the protections of U.S. law in the United States."170 In other words,
she recognizes that patent holders may be offered less protection in other
countries. This weaker protection diminishes the inventor's ability to profit
from its invention. This difference in protection incentivizes the patent
holders to avoid a smaller royalty jurisdiction to enforce worldwide licenses.
Justice Ginsburg reprised the argument she made in Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 171 when discussing the copyright first sale doctrine, and
she re-enforced her argument by noting that, while copyright has been
internationally harmonized, patent rights have not.1 7 2 In Kirtsaeng, she
observed that other territories have different exhaustion doctrines -
including the EU - "under which the sale of a copy anywhere within the
163. Id. at 1537 ("More is at stake when it comes to patents than simply the dealings
between parties, which can be addressed through contract law.").
164. Id. (holding patent exhaustion applies to foreign sales).
165. Id. at 1537.
166. Id. at 1536.
167. Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1531, 1538.
168. Id. at 1537 (noting that exhaustion is triggered when a patent owner makes a
foreign or domestic sale for any amount because it chose to give up the right to exclude
the purchaser for a fee).
169. Id. at 1538 (concurring with the majority regarding domestic exhaustion but
dissenting based upon international exhaustion).
170. See id. at 1538-39 (discussing how U.S. patents do not extend to other countries,
so when the patents are sold abroad the U.S. laws should still protect the patent).
171. 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
172. Impression Products, 137 S. Ct. at 1538.
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European Economic Area exhausts the copyright," but not sales outside the
*173
region.
Thanks to this broad patent exhaustion doctrine, goods can already move
more easily between foreign countries and the U.S., thereby negating the
necessity for U.S.-negotiated worldwide licenses: SEP implementers need
only obtain a license in one of the jurisdictions before the goods reach U.S.
shores.1 7 4 The next subsection discussion method patents, a type of patent
often involved in modem standards.
2. Patent exhaustion limits the rent seeking ability associated with
method patents
Besides contracts, patent holders might resort to other ways to extend their
patent rights and control how the patented goods are sold.
First, a patentee might create a product that required the purchaser to carry
out the last patented step to get a fully functional invention. As such, the
patentee would claim that the incomplete invention did not amount to a (first)
sale. Instead, the recipient of the incomplete invention would be a licensee
under an implicit contract, not a purchaser who could dispose of it at will.
In United States v. Univis Lens Co.,175 Univis Lens held a number of
patents and licensed their uses to wholesalers and retailers.1 76 Univis Lens
collected royalties, commanded how lenses were finished, and imposed a
resale price maintenance on all supply chain participants through licensing
agreements.' 77 The government challenged Univis Lens' licensing practices
on antitrust grounds: the government asserted that the patent did not address
how the lenses were finished and as such, it could not control the sale of
lenses once made.178
The Supreme Court ruled that patent rights cannot be extended through
incomplete processes: when an inventor lawfully sells an unfinished
invention that embodies the essential patented features and that requires the
purchaser to complete the last step in conformity with a patent, it transfers
ownership, allows a license to practice the final stage of the patent procedure,
and exhausts its patent. 179 The inventor can no longer "control the price at
173. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 575.
174. Impression Products, 136 S. Ct. at 1538-39 (2017).
175. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
176. Id. at 244-45 (discussing how the corporation issued three classes of licenses to
wholesalers, finishing retailers and prescription retailers).
177. Id. at 245-46.
178. Id. at 248.
179. Id. at 250-52.
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which it may be sold either in its unfinished or finished form."s0
This issue of incomplete product would resurface some seventy years later
in the form of method patents.'s' However, with method patents, this issue
took a different meaning: more than one product are often necessary to
practice the patented invention.18 2
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,18 3 the U.S. Supreme
Court faced such method patents. In this case, LG Electronics (LGE) held
and licensed its patents to Intel Corp.s4 Intel made microchips that practiced
the patent they licensed from LGE.ss But to practice the patents (i.e. storing
and retrieving data), a computer called
on multiple elements and microchips. 8 6 Some of these elements were
not Intel-made and had not been licensed to practice LGE's patents.s7
Quanta Computer made computers with Intel and non-Intel components.'s
LGE sued Quanta for infringement because the non-licensed components
were practicing LGE's patents.189
The Supreme Court ruled that method claims were exhausted by the sale
of the microchips.1 90 Once more, the Court noted that LGE might have a
breach of contract claim against Intel but not a patent infringement claim
against Quanta.191
180. Id. at 251.
181. See Business Method Patents, IP WATCHDOG, http://www.ipwatchdog.com
/patent/business-method-patents/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (discussing the history of
method patents and their current requirements under U.S. federal law).
182. See business-method patent, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining a business-method patent, or "method patent," as "[a] U.S. patent that describes
and claims a series of process steps that, as a whole, constitutes a method of doing
business," which necessarily requires that there be more than one product to practice the
patented invention).
183. 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).
184. Id. at 621-23.
185. Id. at 623.
186. See id. 623-24 (stating that Quanta created and manufactured products that
practiced LGE patents by using Intel products with other, non-Intel "memory and
buses").
187. See id. at 624.
188. See id. at 624-25.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 638 ("The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent
exhausts the patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent
law to control postsale use of the article.").
191. See id. n.7 ("We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not
necessarily limit LGE's other contract rights. LGE's complaint does not include a
breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract damages might
be available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages.").
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The Supreme Court's ruling in Quanta Computer, Inc. affects the
enforcement of standards and FRAND cases discussed in this paper. Most
patents associated with standard settings in the Information and
Communication Technology industry are method patents.1 9 2 As such, the
patent holders have to restructure their licensing agreements to account for
patent exhaustion.
This interpretation of the patent exhaustion doctrine is not universal. In
China, patent exhaustion doctrine does not apply to patented methods.1 93 For
example, in Jwncomm v. Sony,1 94 the Beijing IP Court ruled that method
patents were not exhausted by the sale of an article that substantially
embodies the patent.1 9 5 As such, patent holders must also adapt to different
jurisdictions.
As discussed, the U.S. Supreme Court has, in a number of cases, noted
that patent holders can more effectively create restrictions through contracts
rather than through its patent rights.1 96 The Supreme Court used the patent
exhaustion doctrine to limit the rights granted to patentees and avoid issues
related to incomplete contracts. 197
In Quanta Computer, Inc., the policy argument that the Court presented
mirrors the policy argument to support worldwide licenses - principally
with respect to the free movement of patented products.1 98 As the Supreme
Court suggested, contracts, rather than patent law, should be used to resolve
the issue of appropriate return on innovation because voluntary negotiations
from worldwide licenses are better equipped to deal with the issue of the
global movement of goods than a patchwork of different patent exhaustion
192. See Kate Gaudry & Tom Franklin, Post-Alice Exam Stats in Software Art Units:
A Bleaker Road, LAW360 (Oct. 03, 2014, 9:39 AM), https://www.kilpatricktownsend.c
om/-/media/Files/articles/2014/Post-Alice%20Exam o2oStats%20Inoo2oSoftware%20
Art%20Units%20A%20Bleajer%/o2ORoad.ashx ("business-method ... patent
applications, includ[e] many software applications focused, for example, on medical
software, business crypto, anti-counterfeiting, fraud detection and electronic voting.").
193. See Yangjin Li, No Exhaustion Doctrine for "method-of-use" Patents
Iwncomm v. Sony Decision in China, TRUST IN IP (July 25, 2017), https://trustinip.com
/no-exhaustion-doctrine-for-method-of-use-patents-iwncomm-v-sony-decision-in-chi
na/.
194. Xi'an Xi Dian Jie Tong Radio Network Co. v. Sony Mobile Communication
(China) Co., Ltd [IWNComm v. Sony], (Jing Zhi Min Chu Zi No. 1194 (Beijing
Intellectual Property Ct. 2015) (China).
195. Id.; see Thomas Cotter, Translation ofA bridged Version oflWNCOMM v. Sony
Judgment, COMP. PAT. REMEDIES (Apr. 8, 2017), http://comparativepatentremedies.blo
gspot.com/2017/04/translation-of-abridged-version-of.html (translation of IWNComm v.
Sony).
196. See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. 637 n.7; supra Section III.A.
197. See Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. 637 n.7.
198. See id. at 636 37.
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doctrines. 199
The patent exhaustion doctrine offers mixed incentives to patent holders
and implementers to negotiate worldwide FRAND licenses. On the one
hand, SEP holders could refuse to negotiate a worldwide license and wait for
the products to reach U.S. shores to ensure they avoid patent exhaustion and
get that premium. On other hand, SEP holders could want to negotiate a
worldwide license because they fear that an implementer enjoin their suit in
the U.S. and attempt to take the suit in a lower premium jurisdiction. These
issues are discussed in more details in the next section.
B. Global Movement ofSEP Implementing Goods
Supply chains are global. A product might be designed in the U.S.,
manufactured in Korea, assembled in China, and sold in Europe. Without
worldwide licenses, any step along this supply chain could be exposed to
infringement claims. Two types of movement can be problematic: (1) the
movement from unlicensed to licensed jurisdictions, and (2) the movement
between licensed jurisdictions.
First, the movement from an unlicensed to a licensed jurisdiction creates
a number of problems. Namely, the patent holder has not received any
benefit abroad 20 0 and can raise infringement claims or block the importation
of the patented good. Additionally, infringement suits will eat into the patent
holder's profits and blocking product imports can be difficult. 2 0 1 Both
options require patent holders to spend more resources monitoring imports,
and some imports may go undetected.
These issues arose in Unwired Planet v. Huawei Technologies.202
Unwired Planet ("Unwired") raised the problems SEP licensor would face
without worldwide licenses in the context of global trade and the movement
of people. 2 03 Huawei Technologies ("Huawei") manufactures its phones in
Venezuela, where Unwired does not have any patents,204 where the IP regime
has been called "inefficient and ineffective," and where there have not been
any patents granted since 2007.205 If Unwired were to agree to a UK license
199. See id. (recommending that the parties look to the structure of the Licensing
Agreement to determine the rights of each party).
200. Impression Prod., 137 S. Ct. at 1538-39.
201. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Economic loss occurs to the patent holder at the place where the
infringing sale is made because the patent owner loses business there.").
202. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [711]
(Eng.).
203. See id. [1]-[4] (providing case background information).
204. Id. [539].
205. See Investment Climate Statements 2018 Venezuela, U.S. Dep't of State (July
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only, unlicensed products may find their way into the UK.206 To account for
these unlicensed imports and roaming consumers, Justice Birrs imposed a
four percent increase on the UK licensing fee. 20 7
While Justice Birrs' licensing fee increase may help avoid additional
litigation, it creates other problems. Justice Birrs implicitly estimates that
Unwired lost four percent of licensing fees because Huawei phones were
used in the UK but purchased in a jurisdiction where Huawei does not have
a license.208 Justice Birrs provides no statistical support to this estimate.209
Such uplift could under- or over-estimate the circulation of foreign
unlicensed goods. 2 10 Therefore, without a fair compensation, patent holders
could be under-incentivized to participate in the standard-setting process.2 1 1
Moreover, this uplift means that licensed users subsidized unlicensed
users. This subsidy means that unlicensed users would pay a lower price for
equipment than licensed users. The discrepancy between pricing abroad and
at home makes arbitrage even more attractive. More arbitrage worsens the
problem and decreases the SEP holders' revenues, which puts even more
pressure on the standard setting-process.
Second, the movements from unlicensed to licensed jurisdictions may not
be the standard-setting process's main concern. SEP holders may worry
more about the movements from a licensed jurisdiction with court mandated
low FRAND rate to the U.S.
The patent exhaustion doctrine offers some protection to U.S. importers.
If, at any point along the supply chain, a supplier paid a licensing fee, then
the importers should be protected from patent litigation under the patent
19, 2018), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2018/wha/281787.htm ("Venezuela's
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime remains inefficient and ineffective. ...
Venezuela ranked as one of the top 20 economies worldwide for unlicensed software and
an estimated 87 percent of the software used in Venezuela in 2014 was
unlicensed.... [The Autonomous Intellectual Property Service (SAPI)] has issued no
new patents since 2007.").
206. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [615]-[17].
207. See id. [619] (showing that the patent exhaustion doctrine does not afford such
protection in the other jurisdictions); see also Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l,
Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538-39 (2017) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that patents
were territorial and U.S. patents do not grant protect abroad and foreign patents do not
grant protection in the U.S. and that the patent exhaustion doctrine should follow the
same principle).
208. UnwiredPlanet Int'l, Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [619].
209. See id. [619] ("Absent any other figures, the parties would agree a simple
percentage uplift on the total handset royalty to take it into account[;] I think a fair,
reasonable uplift is [four percent].").
210. See id. [620]-[2 1] (showing the different margin of error that Huawei suggested).
211. See id. [622] ("The other issue is about the licensor's access to the licensee's
information in the event an audit identifies an underpayment.").
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exhaustion principles (under Boesch v. Graff and Lexmark). In such
situation, the U.S. SEP holders may already have received some benefits
from the patent family. 212 In Lexmark, the Supreme Court has stated patent
rights do not guarantee a U.S.-level premium. 2 13 Therefore, a holder of such
SEP family could be stuck with low court mandated royalty rate because of
the patent exhaustion doctrine.
China has a different approach to FRAND terms.2 14 Electronics are
heavily produced in China, and, for the last decade, electronic standards have
been at the center of numerous U.S. FRAND licensing disputes. 215 First,
China focuses on national licenses terms in Huawei v. InterDigital.216
Second, China has imposed low FRAND rates.2 17 For a while, Chinese
authority hoped that standards could be implemented royalty-free or for
"'significantly lower' than the normal amount." 2 18 While this policy is not
written in official documents, it seems to have been implemented in Huawei
V. InterDigital.219 The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court set the
FRAND rate that Huawei had to pay equal to InterDigital's lowest contracted
rate.220 If Huawei's equipment made in China was imported to the U.S., a
U.S. court following the Lexmark precedent could consider that InterDigital
212. See Impression Prod., 137 S. Ct. at 1538-39 (differentiating between imports
where the patent holders received some benefit from patent protection abroad and
imports where the patent holders did not).
213. Id. at 1538.
214. Sokol & Zheng, supra note 123, at 315.
215. See RAMAN CHITKARA & JIANBIN GAO, CHINA'S IMPACT ON THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY: 2016 UPDATE 5 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/techn
ology/chinas-impact-on-semiconductor-industry/assets/china-impact-of-the-semicondu
ctor-industry-2016-update.pdf (explaining that China has about a third of worldwide
production of electronics); see, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc., 773 F.3d
1201, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing Wi-Fi standards); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc.,
757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing wireless standards); Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1042-45 (discussing Wi-Fi and video standards);
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,
809 F.3d 1295, 1297-99 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing Wi-Fi standards).
216. Id. at 315-17.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 312.
219. Huawei Jishu Youxian Gongsi Su Jiaohu Suzi Tongxin Youxian Gongsi [Huawei
Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc.] 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Zi
No. 305 & 306 (Guangdong High People's Ct. 2013) http://www.mlex.com/
China/Attachments/2014-04-18_AXRC879FW8P38107/guangdonghpc_IDChuawei S
EP_18042014.pdf; ANJIE LAw FIRM, http://en.anjielaw.com/downloadRepository/084d
342a-0bc7-4592-a796-52e9b9f140ce.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (translating Huawei
Tech. Co. v. InterDigital Communications, Inc.) [hereinafter Huawei Translation].
220. Huawei Translation, supra note 219, at 5-6.
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exhausted its rights.22 1
Those low court mandated royalties could disincentivize SEP holders to
participate in the standard-setting process. Because of the patent exhaustion
doctrine, China could become the most important jurisdiction when it comes
setting FRAND licensing terms and royalty rateS 2 22 - and SSOs
everywhere.
IV. CONTRACTS AND POLICES RE-ENFORCEMENT
The patent exhaustion doctrine has attempted to rein in patent holders'
efforts to increase their power over purchasers of patented goods. In the
same vein, FRAND attempts to rein in patent holders' market power post
standard adoption through an ex-ante contractual commitment.
A. FRAND Commitments
Many scholars have debated about the meaning of FRAND
22
commitments.223 All of the court cases described above view FRAND
commitments as contracts where the standard implementer is a third-party
beneficiary.224 The SSOs dictated the terms of these contracts. Most SSOs
already required that the letters of assurance include the "worldwide"
221. Id.
222. D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China, 22 TEx. INTELL. PROP.
L.J.71, 73 ("Because of the size of China's economy, developments onFRAND in China
potentially have global impact on FRAND rates and even the business models of
innovative firms. The operation of market forces will result in globalization of the lowest
rate set by a court or agency for a particular patent or patent portfolio in a major
jurisdiction. China is such a jurisdiction. Consequently, if China is more influential, it
will be because China will be inclined to set rates lower than other jurisdictions. In
essence, what happens in China on FRAND now impacts decision-making in the
boardrooms of Silicon Valley.").
223. See e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 201, 206-07 (2015); Damien Geradin, The Meaning of "Fair
and Reasonable" in the Context of Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21
GEO. MASON L. REv. 919, 921-22 (2014); J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND,
Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931, 951 (2013); Roger G. Brooks &
Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9
INT'L. J. IT STANDARDS AND STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 6 (2011); Damien Geradin &
Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on
Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning ofFRAND, 3 EUR.
COMPETITION J. 101, 114 (2007).
224. See e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012);
Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [572] (Eng.);
Landgericht [LG] Jan. 8, 2016, 7 0 96/14 (¶ 2) (Ger.); see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG]
May 5, 2017, 6 U 55/16 (Ger.).
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language.225 For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola,226 the letters of
assurance promise that the patent holder may grant non-exclusive licenses
on "a worldwide basis without compensation or under reasonable rates, with
reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair
discrimination." 22 7
In courts, SEP implementers have tested the limit of so-called
"worldwide" terms.228 Courts should not allow SEP implementers to pick
and choose which part of the FRAND commitment they want enforced. If a
standard implementer wants FRAND terms based on a third-party
beneficiary theory, then the implementer would have to also agree on the
other terms included in the letter of assurance such as worldwide basis. In
Unwired, Justice Birss concluded that "[a local] portfolio license is not
225. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996 (W.D. Wash.
2012) (stating that letters of assurance are required to include either a disclaimer
restraining the patent holder from enforcing the "Essential Patent Claims," or "a
statement that a license for a compliant implementation of the standard will be made
available to an unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide basis").
226. Id.
227. Id.; see Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 30, 2012) (order granting motion to dismiss Motorola's claim for injunctive relief)
(citing the IEEE letter of assurance; however, the typical ITU letter also provide for
worldwide language); id. at 5-6. ("The Patent Holder will grant a license to an
unrestricted number of applicants on a worldwide, non-discriminatory basis and on
reasonable terms and conditions to use the patented material necessary in order to
manufacture, use, and/or sell implementations of the above ITU-T Recommendation |
ISOC/IEC International Standard.").
228. See Microsoft Corp., 854 F. Supp. 2d at 995-96 (remarking the offer made by
Motorola for the Wi-Fi standard includes the worldwide language whereas the offered
for the video standard does not); id. at 998 (noting that the letter for the license offer for
the Wi-Fi standard states: "This letter is to confirm Motorola's offer to grant Microsoft
a worldwide non-exclusive license.") (emphasis added); id. (comparing that letter with
the offer letter for the video standard which states: "Motorola offers to license the patents
on a non-discriminatory basis on reasonable terms and conditions ('RAND'), including
a reasonable royalty, of 2.25 [percent] per unit for each H.264 compliant product . . . .");
Mannheim Landesgericht [LG] [Regional Courts] May 2, 2012, RECHTSORECHUNG DER
OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN STRAFSACHEN [OLGSt] 1 (8) (Ger.), http
s://www.scribd.com/document/94523005/Translation-of-Mannheim-20240-Ruling-
Motorola-v-Microsoft (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (translating Motorola' suit against
Microsoft in Germany only based on the video standard); [OLGSt] 1 (11) (Ger.)
(discussing the uncertainty of whether Motorola offered a worldwide license for its video
portfolio by paraphrasing: "the Plaintiff's parent company submitted to the Defendant's
parent company an offer, effective for 20 days, described as 'RAND' . . . to enter into an
agreement for a worldwide, nonexclusive license for the portfolio."); Microsoft Corp.,
854 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (quoting the offer without the worldwide language and explaining
that a sophisticated licensor like Motorola would likely make license offers with different
breath consciously); cf Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1056-57 (9th
Cir. 2015) (confirming that Motorola breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing but
the different language was not questioned).
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FRAND." 22 9 He further noted that "the FRAND license between Unwired
Planet and Huawei is a worldwide license."230 SSOs need to echo clearly
that sentiment in their policy documents: the term should be revised to be
WFRAND - worldwide, fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.
In fact, FRAND commitments create obligations for both SEP holders and
implementers.231 Part of these obligations include a requirement that the SEP
implementers communicate in good faith with the SEP holders, according to
recognized industry standard.232 Part of this recognized industry standard
includes worldwide licenses. In Pioneer v Acer, the Mannheim Regional
Court - the lower court - considered that a Germany-only license would
not qualify as a FRAND offer because it failed to follow customary business
practices. 23 3 The court reasoned that an honest and royalty-willing negotiator
will not respond to a license offer by the patent proprietor for a worldwide
portfolio license with a counteroffer limited to Germany.2 34
As such, worldwide licenses should be part of anyone's attempt to obtain
a license under a FRAND license. While courts have enforced this standard,
courts are not the correct venue to deal with these terms.
SSOs have an interest in promoting worldwide licenses because
worldwide licenses encourage widespread adoption and create more network
externalities. SSOs should make a better effort to promote this industry
standard. They can ensure that all parties are educated about the benefits.
They should ensure that implementers know that if they reject the worldwide
aspect of the licensing commitment, they reject all aspect of the commitment
including the reasonable licensing terms. SSOs should also petition with
courts (through amicus briefs) to encourage courts to view the worldwide
aspect of the license as part of the FRAND package.
B. Bundling & Patent Families
Antitrust authority could carve out an antitrust safety zone for bundled
patents that are part of the same patent family. The DOJ and the FTC
229. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, [807 (11)].
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Landgericht Disseldorf [LG] [Diusseldorf Regional Court] Nov. 20,
2014 RECHTSORECHUNG DER OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN STRAFSACHEN [OLGSt] 1
(103(1)) (Ger.), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/listejsfvnum=C-170/13 (discussing the
obligations of SEP holders and implementers during FRAND negotiations).
232. Pedro Henrique D. Batista & Gustavo Cesar Mazutti, Comment, Huawei
Technologies (C-170/13): Standard Essential Patents and Competition Law How Far
Does the CJEUDecision Go? 47 IIC-INT'L R. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 244, 246
(2016).
233. OLGSt 330 (¶¶ 131-33) (Ger.).
234. Id. (¶¶ 132-33) (author translation).
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published their guidelines on a regular basis. 23 5 The DOJ and the FTC
created an Antitrust Safety Zone in their Antitrust Guidelines "to provide
some degree of certainty and thus to encourage such activity [as
licensing]."236 They should create an explicit Safety Zone for tying patents
that belong to the same patent family.
This Safety Zone would fall within their published Guidelines. The
criterion put forth in the Guidelines is: "[a]bsent extraordinary
circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual
property licensing arrangement if (1) the restraint is not facially
anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for
no more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected
by the restraint." 237
In the FRAND context, bundling patents that belong to the same family is
not facially anticompetitive. The tying question may be moot in the patent
family context. Justice Birss in Unwired Planet v. Huawei Technologies
ruled that patents in the same family are different products because patents
in a family may cover slightly different technologies. 23 8  But these
differences are a question of fact. Moreover, even if slightly different, they
could be considered the same patent because they enable similar
processes.239
Even if they were different products, these patents do not facially impede
competition. Faced with a slightly different question, the Federal Circuit
court established that bundling essential and non-essential patents was not a
per se violation of antitrust laws. 2 40 The Federal Circuit found that package
patent licensing provided efficiencies and "reject[ed] the Commission's
conclusion that [SEP holder's bundling] conduct showed a 'lack of any
redeeming virtue' and should be 'conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use."'
241
In fact, in no case discussed above did the SEP implementers show that
tying these different patents was anticompetitive or had anticompetitive
235. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 54 (providing
2017 guidelines).
236. Id. at 24.
237. Id.
238. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [546]
(Eng.).
239. Id. [546] ("A patent in one state is clearly separate from a member of the same
patent family in another state . . .. However the way in which FRAND royalty rates are
determined in practice treats these two distinct patents as a single thing.").
240. U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1193-97 (2005).
241. Id. at 1193 (internal citation omitted).
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effects. 24 2  SEP holders do not gain a competitive advantage over their
competitors because (in theory) they have no competitors for their patents
because the patent is essential (i.e., without a work around).
Furthermore, FRAND commitments can be interpreted as a guarantee that
any willing licensee has access to the patent on similar terms. 2 43 As such,
the worldwide license - even if it ties patents - would not have
anticompetitive effects at the patented product level.
Alternatively, SSOs can work with the DOJ to signal that these worldwide
licenses are not an antitrust violation. Any SSO can write a request for a
business review letter, and the DOJ could clarify that such licenses do not
violate the antitrust laws.244 Such a signal could encourage courts to adopt
the same view and would avoid guess-work about the movement of goods
and individuals to impose an appropriate uplift.
C. Worldwide License & Patent Exhaustion
In Birdsell v. Shaliol,245 the Supreme Court held that if an infringer paid
damages for infringement and resold the machine, the patent holder could
sue the purchaser of the machine because its patent rights had not been
exhausted.246 The infringement damages did not exhaust the patent.247
However, court-imposed FRAND terms are not always damages. For
example, in some FRAND cases, the SEP holders commit to grant a
license; 2 48 but in some cases, the (foreign) courts set what they consider
242. See id. at 1193-97; Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017]
EWHC (Pat) 711 (Eng.), [787], [791] (rejecting that the SEP holder's bundling or tying
of SEPs and non-SEPs was unlawful).
243. See generally Gabison, supra note 2, at 114-23 (analyzing contextual and court
interpretations of FRAND commitments as guarantees of licensee access to patents on
similar terms).
244. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing how SSOs have
consulted with the DOJ to ensure their policies did not violate antitrust laws); see also
Business Review Letters and Request Letters, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justic
e.gov/atr/business-review-letters-and-request-letters (last visited Feb. 5, 2019); id.
(showing that the DOJ's record goes as far back as 1991 and no letter since 1991 refers
to these worldwide licenses); Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights:
Promoting Innovation and Competition, DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N 103-
14 (Apr. 2007), www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf (showing that the
DOJ and FTC have in the past held hearings about the antitrust implications of
intellectual property rights); id. at 103 (referring to tying and bundling intellectual
property rights similarly to the guidelines but does not refer to worldwide licenses).
245. 112 U.S. 485 (1884).
246. Id. at 488-89.
247. Id. at 488.
248. See Gabison, supra note 2, at 102, 105, 118.
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249FRAND royalty rates.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not been faced with needing to set FRAND
royalty rates. When faced with the situation, the Court may need to clarify
the patent exhaustion doctrine as applied to this context. Based on precedent,
the Court should rule that any benefits drawn abroad or at home (under
Lexmark) exhaust the patent rights of the holder if the benefits were extracted
voluntarily (under Boesch and Birdsell). The reasoning is that, during
voluntary negotiation, the SEP holder can control better what the uplifts must
be to avoid arbitrage, which may not be a concern for courts setting FRAND
royalty rates.
Therefore, the Court would avoid having to decide whether a court-
mandated rate that is adjudged to be fair and reasonable in China would be
fair and reasonable in the U.S. The Court would avoid having to determine
whether the SEP holders may be better off having a lower worldwide rate
rather than forgoing the Chinese market entirely to avoid having a low rate
in other jurisdictions under patent exhaustion.
V. CONCLUSION
Worldwide licenses play an important role within the FRAND standard
and the standard setting process. However, the attacks on this aspect of
FRAND licenses should come as no surprise. SEP implementers have a lot
to learn. By requesting national licenses, implementers increase the
litigation and monitoring costs of SEP holders, which they can leverage into
lower royalty rates. This form of rent-seeking should be construed as a
holdout.
Forum-shopping remains an issue with worldwide licenses. SEP holders
and implementers may seek the most favorable terms to their cause among
the mosaic of FRAND term interpretations and attempt to impose these terms
through worldwide licenses. But avoiding forum shopping does not warrant
losing the efficiencies associated with worldwide licenses. 2 50  The
efficiencies these licenses offer should be protected - even from long-
standing doctrines like the patent exhaustion doctrine.
249. See, e.g., Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, supra note 26 (discussing how different
judges have estimated FRAND royalty rates and damages, distinguishing the two).
250. Unwired Planet Int'l, Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2018] EWCA Civ. 2344 (Eng.),
[100]-[04] (considering the argument that avoiding forum shopping does not warrant
losing the efficiencies associated with worldwide licenses, and finding that "a court in
one country will decide, as between the parties, whether a global or multi-territorial
license is FRAND but that is inevitable and we see nothing unfair about it, and it most
certainly does not deprive a licensee from challenging the validity and essentiality of the
SEPs in any jurisdiction where it may choose to do so.").
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